Kant and Equality Essay

Some readers of this essay entirelyow for have become anxious by now because they believe that the problem that perplexes me has been definitively solved by Im worlduel Kant. It is certainly true that Kant held strong opinions on this matter. In an often-quoted passage, he reports a psycheal alteration from elitism I am myself a researcher by inclination. I feel the whole thirst for knowledge and the eager unrest to move further on into it, in like manner satisf spielion with each acquisition.There was a time when I thought this al angiotensin-converting enzyme could constitute the honor of philanthropy and despised the know naught rabble. Rousseau set me straight. This delusory superiority vanishes, I learn to honor men, and I would find myself much useless than a common laborer if I did non believe this observation could give every iodin a value which restores the arights of humanity. What Kant learned from Rousseau was the proposition that the behind of human mateity is the dignity that each human person possesses in virtue of the message for autonomy ( deterrent example freedom).This virtuous freedom has two aspects, the cleverness to set checks for oneself according to ones conception of what is wakeless, and the capacity to regulate ones choice of extirpates and of actions to achieve ones ends by ones conception of what lessonity requires. According to Kants psychology, brute animals be fit(p) to act as instinct inc lines them, but a reasonable macrocosm has the power to interrogate the inclinations it feels, to raise the question what it is reasonable to do in given completely over circumstances, and to choose to do what reason suggests even a pee-peest alto maintainher inclinations.The question arises whether Kants psychology is correct, or remotely close to correct. peradventure roughthing like the conflict amid virtuous nose out and inclination is experienced by social animals other than macrocosm. Perhaps the fre edom that Kant imputes to human on metaphysical primes squirt be shown to be either empiri countery nonexistent or illusory. For our purposes we tush set these questions aside and scarcely presume that the human psychological complexity envisaged by Kant does describe capacity we possess, whether or non it is shared with other animals.My question is whether Kants characterization, if it was correct, would have the normative implication she draws from it. It king seem that the Kantian picture sustains to show how moral freedom is arrange concept, which does not signifi terminatetly admit of percentage points. If one has the capacity to set an end for oneself, one does not possess this freedom to a lesser extent simply because one cannot set fancy ends, or because other persons can set fancier ends.If one has the power to regulate choice of ends by ones sense of what is morally right, one does not possess this freedom to a lesser extent because one cannot understand sophistic ated moral considerations, or because other persons can understand more sophisticated moral considerations. Moreover, one exponent hold that it is having or lacking the freedom which is important, not having or lacking the capacity to exercise the freedom in fancy authoritys. exactly the old worries lurk just around the corner.The Kantian billet is that there are indeed capacities that are crucial for the ascription of fundamental moral status that do not vary in degree. One either has the capacity or one does not, and thats that. If the crucial capacities have this character, wherefore the problem of how to draw a no arbitrary line on a continuum and hold all bes on one side of the line full persons and all beings on the other side of the line lesser beings does not arise. The line separating persons and nonpersons leave alone be non arbitrary, and there will be no basis for further disagreeentiation of moral status.One is either a person or not, and all persons are equal. Consider the capacity to set an end, to choose a goal and decide on an action to achieve it. One might suppose that all humans have this capacity except for the permanently comatose and the anencephalic. So all humans are entitled to a fundamental equal moral status. This view is streng thereforeed by noting that there are other capacities that do admit of degrees that interact with the no degree capacities. Individuals who equally have the capacity to set an end whitethorn well differ in the quality of their end-setting performances.Some are able to set ends more reasonably than others. But these fights in performance do not gainsay the fundamental equal capacity. It is just that having a high or low level of associated capacities enables or impedes successful performance. So the fact that individuals differ in their abilities to do arithmetic and more complex mathematical operations that affect their ability to make rational choices should have no tendency to heterogeneous the m ore basic and morally status-conferring equality in the capacity of each person to make choices.In response First of all, if several of these no degree capacities were relevant to moral status, one essential possess all to be at the top status, and some individuals possess more and others fewer of the relevant capacities, a problem of hierarchy, though perchance a manageable one, would emerge anew. More important, I doubt there is a plausible no degree capacity that can do the work this argument assigns to it. Take the capacity to set ends and make choices. Consider a being that has little brain power, but over the course of its life can set just a few ends and make just a few choices based on considering two or three simple alternatives.It sets one end (lunch, now) per decade three times over the course of its life. If there is a capacity to set ends, period, not admitting of degrees, this being possesses it. The point is that it is clearly not exclusively the capacity to set en ds, but something more complex that renders a being a person in our eyes. What matters is whether or not one has the capacity to set sensible ends and to pick among alternative end at a reasonable pace, sorting through complex considerations that wait on the choice of ends and responding in a rational course to these considerations.But this capacity, along with every(prenominal) similar or related capacity that might be urged as a substitute for it, definitely admits of degrees. The same point would hold if we pointed to free will or moral autonomy as the relevant person-determining capacity. It is not the ability to choose an end on ground of consideration for moral considerations merely, but the ability to do this in a nuanced and fine-grained responsive way, that is belike deemed to entitle a being to personhood status.In general, we single out rationality, the ability to respond appropriately to reasons, as the capacity that is pertinent to personhood, by itself or in conjun ction with related abilities, and rationality so understood admits of degrees. Kant whitethorn well have held that the uses of reason that are required in order to have a well-functioning conscience that can tell right from wrong are not very sophisticated and are well within the reach of all non sore non feebleminded humans. Ordinary intelligence suffices. His discussions of applying the categorical imperative form test certainly convey this impression.But commentators tend to agree that there is no simple general-purpose moral test that easily answers all significant moral questions. Thus Christine Korsgaard cautions that the categorical imperative test is not a Geiger counter for detecting the heraldic bearing of moral duties, and Barbara Herman ob give ears that the application of the categorical imperative test to eggshells cannot be a mechanical procedure but relies on prior moral understanding by the performer and on the agentive roles capacity to make relevant moral di scriminations and judgments and to characterize her own proposed maxims perspicuously.These comments confirm what should be clear in any event Moral problems can be complex and unwieldy, and there is no discernible upper bound to the complexity of the reasoning required to master and perhaps solve them. But suppose I do the best I can with my limited cognitive resources, I make a judgment as to what is morally right, however misguided, and I am conscientiously resolved to do what I take to be morally right. The capacity to do what is right can be movered into two components, the ability to decide what is right and the ability to dispose oneself to do what one thinks is right.One might hold the latter capacity to be the true locus of human dignity and expense. Resisting temptation and doing what one thinks is right is noble and admirable even if ones conscience is a disconnected thermometer. However, one might doubt that being disposed to follow ones conscience is unambiguously g ood when ones conscience is ill in error. For one thing, moral flaws such as a lazy indisposition to hard thinking and an obsequious deference toward established power and ascendancy might play a large role in fixing the content of ones judgments of conscience.A conceited lack of healthy question active ones cognitive powers might be a determinant of ones strong disposition to do whatever one thinks to be right. Even if Kant is correct that the good will, the will directed unfailingly at what is truly right, has an absolute and unconditional worth, it is doubtful that the would-be good will, a will directed toward what it takes to be right on whatever flimsy or solid grounds appeal to it, has such worth. Take an extreme case Suppose a incident person has a would-be good will that is always in error.This could be strong or righteous, so that the agent always does what he thinks is right, or weak and corrupt, so that the agent never does what she thinks is right. If the will is a lways in error, the odds of doing the right thing are increase if the would-be good will is weak and corrupt. Some might value more highly on consequential grounds the weak and corrupt inconclusive will, even though the strong and righteous invariably erroneous will always shines like a jewel in its own right.And some might hold that quite aside from the expected consequences, performing on a seriously erroneous judgment of right is inherently of lesser worth than acting on correct judgment of right. Even if the disposition to do what one thinks morally right is unassailable, its purported value does not provide a sound basis for asserting the equal worth and dignity of human persons. The capacity to act conscientiously itself varies empirically across persons like any other valued capacity.A favorable genetic endowment and favorable early socialization experiences bestow more of this capacity on some persons and less on others. If we think of an agents will as disposed more or les s strongly to do what she conscientiously believes to be right, different individuals with the same disposition will experience good and bad luck in facing temptations that exceed their resolve. Even if we assume that agents always have freedom of the will, it will be difficult to different degrees for different persons to exercise their free will as conscience dictates.Moreover, individuals will vary in their psychological capacities to dispose their will to do what conscience dictates. One might retreat further to the claim that all persons equally can try to dispose their will to do what is right, even if they will stick to in this enterprise to different degrees. But the ability to try is also a psychological capacity that we should expect would vary empirically across persons. At times Kant seems to appeal to epistemic grounds in reasoning from the goodness of the good will to the equal worth and dignity of all human persons.We codt know what anyones inner motivations are, ev en our own, so the judgment that anyone is firmly disposed to do what is right can never be confirmed. But surely the main issue is whether humans are so ordered that we ought to accord them fundamental equal moral status, not whether, given our beliefs, it is reasonable for us to act as if they are so ordered. The idea that there is a threshold of rational agency capacity such that any being with a capacity above the threshold is a person equal in fundamental moral status to all other persons prompts a worry about how to send this threshold non arbitrarily.It might seem that notwithstanding the contrast between nil capacity and some capacity would preclude the skeptical doubt that the line set at any positive level of capacity could just as well have been set higher or lower. Regarding the proposal to identify any above-zero capacity as qualifying one for personhood, we imagine a being with barely a glimmer of capacity to perceive the good and the right and to dispose its will t oward their attainment. The difference between none and some might be infinitesimal, after all.However, a threshold need not be razor-thin. Perhaps there is a line below which beings with rational capacities in this range are definitely not persons and a higher level such that all beings with capacities above this level are definitely persons. Beings with rational capacities that fall in the middle range or gray area between these levels are near-persons. The levels can be set sufficiently far apart that the difference between scoring at the lower and the higher levels is undeniably of moral significance.But the difference between the rational capacities of the beings just above the higher line, call them marginal persons, and the beings at the upper end of the scale who have saintly genius capacities, is not thereby shown to be insignificant. At the lower end we might imagine persons like the villains depicted in the Dirty Harry Clint Eastwood movies. These unfortunates are not sho wn as having moral capacities which they are flouting, but rather as bad by nature, and perhaps not entitled to full human rights.No doubt this is a crass outlook, but the question remains whether the analysis we can offer of the basis for human equality generates a refutation of it. Suppose someone asserts that the difference between the rational agency capacities of the most perceptive saints and the most unreflective and animalistic villains defines a difference in fundamental moral status that is just as important for morality as the difference between the rational agency capacities of near-persons and marginal persons. What mistake does this claim embody?COMMENTS ON KANTS good THEORY Because we so commonly take it for granted that moral values are intimately connected with the goal of human well-being or delight, Kants insistence that these two concepts are absolutely independent makes it difficult to grasp his point of view and easy to misunderstand it. The following comment s are intended to help the you to avoid the most common misunderstandings and appreciate the sort of outlook that characterizes what Kant takes to be the heart of the honourable life.Kants ethical system is often cited as the effigy of a deontological theory. Although the theory certainly can be seriously criticized, it remains probably the finest analysis of the bases of the concepts of moral rule and moral certificate of indebtedness. Kants endeavor to ground moral duty in the nature of the human being as essentially a rational being marks him as the last capital prudence thinker.In spite of the fact that his critical philosophy in epistemology and metaphysics brought an end to The Age of Reason, in ethics his attempt to derive the form of any ethical duty from the very nature of a rational being is the philosophical high water mark of the Enlightenments vision of humanity as essentially and uniquely rational.What Kant aims to provide is a metaphysics of morals in the sense of an analysis of the grounds of moral obligation in the nature of a rational being. In other words, Kant aims to deduce his ethical theory purely by a priori reasoning from the concept of what it is to be a human person as a rational agent.The fact that batch have the faculty of being able to use reason to decide how to act expresses the fundamental metaphysical principle -the basis or foundation in the nature of reality- on which Kants ethical theory is erected. Kant begins his treatise, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals with the famous dramatic meter Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will. 1. What does Kant intend by good without qualification?Obviously hoi polloi try to seek and avoid many different sorts of things those things which they seek they call good, while those they try to avoid, they call bad. These goods which people seek whitethorn be divided in to those which are sought as way of life to some further end and those which they seek as good as ends in themselves. Obviously some things may be good as means to one end and bad as means to some other end. Different persons, motivated by different ends, will thus find different things good and bad (relative to their different ends).More nourishment is good to a starving man, but it is bad to one overweight. In order for something to be good without qualification it must not be merely good as means to one end but bad as means to some other end. It must be sought as good totally independently of serving as a means to something else it must be good in-itself. Furthermore, while one thing may be good as means relative to a incident end, that end becomes a means relative to some other end. So a college diploma may be sought as good as a means for the end of a higher-paying job.And a higher-paying job may be good as a means to increased financial security and increased financial sec urity may be good as a means to obtaining the necessities of life as well as a few of its luxuries. However, if we seek A only for the interest group of B, and B only for the sake of C, and so forth , then there is never a justification for seeking A at the beginning of such a series unless there is something at the end of that series which we seek as a good in-itself not merely as means to some further end. much(prenominal) an ultimate end would then be an absolute rather than a relative good. Kant means that a good will is good without qualification as such an absolute good in-itself, universally good in every instance and never merely as good to some yet further end. 2. Why is a good will the only thing which is universally absolutely good? Kants point is that to be universally and absolutely good, something must be good in every instance of its occurrence.He argues that all those things which people call good (including intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, persever ance, power, riches, honor, health, and even triumph itself) can become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them is not good. In other words, if we imagine a bad person (i. e. one who willed or wanted to do evil), who had all of these questionable goods (intelligence, wit, etc. ), these very traits would make only that much worse his will to do what is wrong.(We would get the criminal master-mind of the comic books. ) Even health often also cited as a good in- itself may regale to make a person insensitive and indifferent to the lack of good health in others. 3. Isnt happiness such a universal, absolute good in-itself? Kant answers clearly, No. However, many philosophers (the ones we call eudaemonists) have assumed the obvious answer to be Yes. All past eudaemonistic ethical theories as well as modern utilitarian theories virtually define happiness as the absolute end of all ethical behavior.Such eudaemonistic ethical theories are attractive bec ause of the fact that they make it easy to answer the question Why should I do what is morally right? For any eudaemonistic theory the answer will always be Because the morally right action is always ultimately in the interest of your own happiness. Since these theories generally assume that people really are motivated by a want for their own happiness, their only problem is to show that the morally right action really does serve as the best means to obtain the end of happiness.Once you are led to see this, so such theories assume, the question Why should I do what is morally right? is automatically answered. Kant totally rejects this eudaemonistic way of ethical theorizing he calls decisions make according to such a calculation of what produces your own happiness prudential decisions and he distinguishes them sharply from ethical decisions. This is not because Kant thinks we are not motivated by a require for happiness, in fact like the ancient philosophers, he takes it for gra nted that we are however, such motivation cannot be that which makes an action ethically right or wrong.The fact that an action might lead to happiness cannot be the grounds of moral obligation. Kant regards the mental picture of happiness as both too indefinite and too empirical to serve as the grounds for moral obligation why we ought to do something. In the first place it is too indefinite because all people have very different sorts of talents, tastes and enjoyments which mean in case that one persons happiness may be another persons misery. This is because the concept is empirical in the sense that the only way you can know whether what you seek will actually serve to bring you happiness is by experience.As Kant points out, it is impossible that the most clear-sighted man should frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this. Since we cannot know a priori before an action whether it really will be conducive to our happiness (because the notion is so indefinite that even the most clear-sighted amongst us cannot know everything that must form part of his own happiness) the desire for our own happiness cannot serve as a motivation to determine our will to do this or that action. Moreover, Kant observes that even the general well-being and contentment with ones condition that is called happiness, can inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind. In other words happiness cannot be good without qualification for if we imagine it occurring in a person totally devoid of the desire to do what is right, it could very well lead to all sorts of immoral actions. 4. What does Kant mean by a good will? To act out of a good will for Kant means to act out of a sense of moral obligation or duty.In other words, the moral agent does a particular action not because of what it produces (its consequences) in terms of human experience, but because he or she recognizes by reasoning that it is morally the right thing to do and thus regards him or herself as having a moral duty or obligation to do that action. One may of course as an added fact get some pleasure or other gain from doing the right thing, but to act morally, one does not do it for the sake of its desirable consequences, but rather because one understands that it is morally the right thing to do.In this respect Kants view towards morality parallels the Christians view concerning obedience to Gods commandments, according to which the Christian obeys Gods commandments simply because God commands them, not for the sake of rewards in heaven after death or from fear of punishment in hell. In a similar way, for Kant the rational being does what is morally right because he recognizes himself as having a moral duty to do so rather than for anything he or she may get out of it. 5. When does one act from a motive of doing ones duty?Kant answers that we do our moral duty when our motive is determined by a pr inciple recognized by reason rather than the desire for any expected consequence or emotional feeling which may cause us to act the way we do. The will is defined as that which provides the motives for our actions. Obviously many times we are motivated by particular proposition desires or emotions. I may act the way I do from a feeling of friendship for a particular individual, or from desire for a particular consequence. I may also be motivated by particular emotions of fear, or envy, or pity, etc.When I act in these ways, I am motivated by a desire for a particular end in Kants vocabulary I am said to act out of inclination. Insofar as an action is motivated by inclination, the motive to do it is contingent upon the desire for the particular end which the action is imagined to produce. Thus as different rational agents might have different inclinations, there is no one motive from inclination common to all rational beings. Kant distinguishes acts motivated by inclination from tho se done on principle.For example someone may ask why I did a certain thing, and point out that it brought me no gain, or perhaps even made life a bit less pleasant to which I might reply, I know I do not stand to gain by this action, but I do it because of the principle of the thing. For Kant, this sort of state of mind is the essence of the moral consciousness. When I act on principle the sole factor determining my motive is that this particular action exemplifies a particular case falling under a general law or maxim. For Kant the mental process by which the actor understands that a particular case falls under a certain principle is an exercise in reasoning, or to be more precise, what Kant called hard-nosed reason, reason used as a guide to action. (Pure Reason is reason used to attain certainty, or what Kant called scientific knowledge. ) Since to have moral worth an action must be done on principle, and to see that a certain principle applies to a particular action requires th e exercise of reason, only rational beings can be said to behave morally. 6. Why does Kant believe that to have moral worth an action must be done on principle rather than inclination?Kants argument here may seem strange to the contemporary outlook, for it assumes that everything in nature is designed to serve a purpose. Now it is an obvious fact that human beings do have a faculty of practical reason, reason applied to the guidance of actions. (Kant is of course fully mindful the people often fail to employ this faculty i. e. they act non-rationally (without reason) or even irrationally (against what reason dictates) but he intends that his ethical theory is normative, prescribing how people ought to behave, rather than descriptive of how they actually do behave.)If everything in nature serves some purpose then the faculty of practical reason must have some purpose. Kant argues that this purpose cannot be merely the attainment of some specific desired end, or even the attainment o f happiness in general, for if it were, it would have been far make better for nature simply to have endowed persons with an instinct to achieve this end, as is the case with the non- rational animals. Therefore, the fact that human beings have a faculty of practical reason cannot be explained by claiming that it allows them to attain some particular end.So the fact that reason can guide our actions, but cannot do so for the sake of achieving some desired end, leads Kant to the decision that the function of practical reason must be to allow humans as rational beings to apply general principles to particular instances of action, or in other words to engage in moral reasoning as a way of determining ones moral obligation what is the right action to do. Thus we act morally only when we act rationally to apply a moral principle to determine the motive of our action. 7. Do all persons have the same moral duties? According to Kant only rational beings can be said to act morally.Reason f or Kant (as for all the Enlightenment thinkers) is the same for all persons in other words there isnt a poor mans reason versus a rich mans reason or a white mans reason versus a black mans reason. All persons are equal as potentially rational beings. Therefore, if reason dictates that one person, in a particular situation, has a moral duty to do a particular thing, then any person, in that same situation, would equally well have a duty to do that same thing. In this sense Kants reasoning parallels the way in which stoicism led Roman lawyers to the conclusion that all citizens are equal before the law.Thus Kant is a moral absolutist in the sense that all persons have the same moral duties, for all persons are equal as rational beings. But this absolutism does not mean that Kant holds that our moral duties are not relative to the situation in which we find ourselves. Thus it is quite possible for Kant to conclude that in one particular situation I may have a duty to keep my promise, but in another situation (in which, for example, keeping a promise conflicts with a higher duty) I may equally well be morally obligated to break a promise. 8.Why is it that actions done for the sake of some end cannot have moral worth? Since what ones moral duties are in a particular situation are the same for all persons, ones moral duties must be independent of the particular likes and dislikes of the moral agent. Now any action which is motivated by the desire for some particular end presupposes that the agent has the desire for that end. However, from the simple concept of a rational being it is not possible to deduce that any particular rational being would have any particular desired ends.Most people, of course, desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain, but there is no logical contradiction involved in the notion of a rational being who does not desire pleasure or perhaps who desires pain. Thus reason does not dictate that any particular rational being has any particular end. B ut if the desire for a particular end gave an action its moral worth, then only those rational beings who happened in fact to desire that end would regard such actions as good, while those that desired to avoid such an end, would regard the action as bad. (Thus for example eudaemonistic theories which assume the end of achieving happiness is what gives an action its moral value, would serve to induce only those beings who happened to have the desire for happiness to behave morally. For those rational beings who happened to desire to avoid happiness, there would be no incentive to behave morally and what appears good to the happiness-seeker will appear positively bad to one who seeks to avoid happiness. ) But, as we have seen above, Kants absolutism reaches the conclusion that moral obligation is the same for all persons.Thus the ground of moral obligation, what makes an action a moral duty, cannot lie in the end which that act produces. 9. What does reason tell us about the principl e that determines the morally dutiful motive? Since Kant has ruled out the ends (i. e. the consequences) which an act produces as well as any motive but those determined by the application of principle as determining moral duty, he is faced now with the task of deriving the fundamental principles of his ethical theory solely from the concept of what it is to be a rational being.He now argues (in a very obscure manner) that from this notion of what is demanded by being rational, he can deduce that it would be irrational to act on any principle which would not apply equally to any other actor in the same situation. In other words, Kant claims that reason dictates that the act we are morally obligated to do is one which is motivated by adherence to a principle which could, without inconsistency, be held to apply to any (and all) rational agents.This fundamental ethical principle, which is commonly called The Categorical Imperative, Kant summarizes with the statement that I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim become a universal law. Kants claim that Reason demands the moral agent to act on a universal law thus in many ways parallels Jesus dictum that God commands that those who love Him obey The Golden Rule. 10. What is a categorical imperative? Any statement of moral obligation which I make the principle of my action (my maxim in Kants vocabulary), in the context of a specific situation, constitutes an imperative. I might, in such a situation, choose to act on a statement of the form, If I desire some specific end (e. g. happiness, supreme pleasure, power, etc. ), then I ought to do such and such an action. In doing so I would be acting on what Kant calls a hypothetical imperative. However, Kant has already ruled out ends as the grounds for moral obligation thus hypothetical imperatives cannot serve as the basis for determining my moral duty. However, if I act on a principle which has the form, In circumstances of such and such a character, I ought to.